27th April 2013,

Democratist has been out of the loop for a while, working on other projects, but we simply had to write a few lines of comment on an outstandingly crass piece of FSB disinfo masquerading as “journalism”, because it demonstrates so much about how isolated the Russian government finds itself with regard to human rights and democracy these days.

The offending article, “Why France’s gay Marriage debate has started to look like a revolution.” is written by John Laughland, “Director of Studies” at the most-ironic-name-we-could-think-of Institution of Democracy and Co-Operation in Paris. Apparently, the IDC was set up by Russian NGOs and private businesses to expose “double standards” by the West with regard to Human Rights and democracy.

The truth is, of course that genuinely independent Russian NGOs and private businesses have little interest in this kind of whataboutism.

But guess who does?

Anyway, the essence of this idiotic article is that France’s legalization of gay marriage is about to result in a revolution bringing down the government.

Say what?

Yes indeed. According to Mr. Laughland;

“Revolutions are often sparked by an unexpected shock to an already weakened regime. As commentators in France remark not only on the crisis engulfing François Hollande’s government but also on the apparent death-rattle of the country’s entire political system, it could be that his flagship policy of legalising gay marriage — or rather, the gigantic public reaction against it, unique in Europe — will be the last straw that breaks the Fifth -Republic’s back.”

So there you go folks: Some of you may have thought that there was no historical precedent for this kind of thing; that there has never been a case anywhere in the world where an established democracy was overthrown by revolution; that while many people in France may disagree with gay marriage. they will continue to respect their democratic political system and restrict themselves to peaceful protest.

But you’re wrong! Oh so wrong! In fact they’re massing in the streets in their millions, and anyone who says that perhaps the numbers were a little less (or even a lot less) has clearly been taken into by the lies of those queer-loving French coppers, because;

“Credible accusations surfaced in Le Figaro on Monday night that the film taken from police helicopters on 24 March and released by the prefecture has been manipulated to reduce the apparent numbers of demonstrators.”

Ah I see. It’s all a conspiracy… again.

Laughland blathers on;

“Had the mobilisation in Paris taken place in Tahrir Square, the world’s media would be unanimous that a ‘French spring’ was about to sweep away an outdated power structure… By the same token, had the Moscow security forces tear-gassed children and mothers…the worldwide moral policemen on CNN would be frantically firing their rhetorical revolvers. Such repression would be interpreted as a sign that the regime was desperate. Indeed, had the Ukrainian police removed the ‘tent village’ which formed in central Kiev at the time of the Orange Revolution in 2004 — as the Paris police bundled more than 60 anti-gay marriage campers into detention on the night of 14 April — then one suspects that Nato tanks would have rolled over the Dnieper to their rescue.”

Now we seem to be getting to the crux of the matter. “You would have sent in the tanks if it was us.” Says paranoid Moscow’s none-too-subtle mouth-piece. “How dare you criticise our rigged elections, our repressive anti-gay laws, our attempts to imprison any well-known critic of the regime on trumped-up charges through our shambolic non-independent court system. Shame on you!”

Point is, France doesn’t have “an out-dated power structure.” Its a democratic country, and you can demonstrate all you want, and vote for anyone you like, even a bonkers Trotskyite like Jean-Luc Melichon, or an idiot fascist like Marine Le Pen; and your vote will actually count, unlike (say) the Russian 2011 parliamentary elections.

And so it is very clear, of the two, whose system is outdated, and where “spring” is due next.

May 21st 2012,

The period since the election of Viktor Yanukovich to the Ukrainian Presidency in February 2010 has been a shambles: Support for his Party of the Regions (PoR) has slumped even in its traditional heartlands in the east of the country. There has been a massive and apparently uncontrollable rise in corruption. Ukraine dropped some 18 places in Transparency International’s Index to a woeful 154th place last December, and things now appear to be getting even worse. Potential fraud in parliamentary elections in the autumn may provoke a violent backlash.

President Yanukovich is in the process of creating a highly personalized style of government. According to our sources, all revenue streams have now been put under the control of family or close friends, including the national bank, finance ministry, treasury, tax, and customs. Additionally, the main security organs have come under similarly personalized control, including the prosecutor’s office and the Security Service (now run by the President’s elder son). Even the Party of the Regions is its losing relevance as the President comes to draw more and more on direct ties.

FDI has dried up, and most M&A activity is domestic, with international firms taking a cautious back seat. The exception to this rule is oil and gas, where Shell and Chevron are being bought in because local companies lack expertise to extract recently discovered shale gas. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many ex-pats have already left, or are making plans to do so over the next few months. Additionally, there is speculation that visa requirements might be brought back in for EU nationals.

These developments have been distressing for those who voted for former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in February 2010, but even more so for those, concentrated in the south and east, who voted for Yanukovich on the basis that he might offer something better than the political and economic instability which followed the 2004 Orange Revolution. In fact corruption, and the expropriation of businesses through a captured legal system have been especially evident in these parts of the country.

But while popular resentment is running high throughout Ukraine, the opportunity for the population to make its voice heard at the elections in October may be subject to interference. The current administration does not have a good track-record when it comes to electoral fraud: Yanukovich was initially summoned to Kiev precisely because he was able to help the PoR garner a majority for Leonid Kuchma during the 1999 polls. The falsification during the 2004 presidential elections remains an exemplar of all the varied means by which manipulation can be achieved, not least the 1.1 million votes added to Yanukovich’s tally by computer hacking during the second round. It cannot be ruled out that the current government might again resort to these familiar tactics.

Ms. Tymoshenko has already been imprisoned on apparently politically motivated charges, as a way of preventing her running in October, and it seems that technical measures will be found to ensure she is unable to stand for parliament, even if she is freed in order to placate the EU. Nonetheless, her imprisonment has acted to boost her waning popularity, and if released she can be expected to campaign with her usual dynamism for the opposition. This will boost their poll ratings considerably and raise the stakes in advance of the 2015 presidential election.

However, if mass falsification does take place and is uncovered, the question of the 2015 polls may become less relevant. There is real anger on the streets at the lack of official accountability. This was demonstrated by the nationwide unrest that took place in March after local police refused to charge two politically connected youths who raped an 18 year-old girl and left her for dead in the southern town of Mykolayiv. The potential for violence on all sides is becoming clearer. The most important question to be answered in October is therefore: Will popular anger once again explode into protest as it did in 2004, or is the population, especially in the eastern Donbass, so scared that they will stay at home during the election period? The reaction of these towns is critical because, if eastern Ukraine comes out in protest, the traditionally opposition-minded west will rise for sure.

May 2nd 2012,

In our last article, Democratist wrote about the concept of “international society as homogeneity”: The basic idea is that states become more like each other over time because of the spread of ideas or ideologies at the international level; for example, the French revolution of 1789 popularized the ideas of nationalism, democracy and a more centralized state, which then became influential throughout Europe in the following two centuries. At around the same time the rise of the British Empire underscored the importance of science for national power through the industrial revolution.

As states compete against each other they promote ideas like nationalism, mass education, investment in infrastructure, and innovation to improve their international position: In each case the elite seeks to protect itself from the ultimate threat of military defeat through modernization.  As a result, states begin to resemble each other not only because of globalization or the exchange of ideas, but because their rulers have a vested interest in becoming more “modern” in order to protect their legitimacy at home, and compete internationally.

In many countries, this process has contributed to the adoption of democracy. In Britain for example, the extension of the franchise to the working class in 1918 can be seen, at least in part, as a reaction to the 1917 revolution, and fear of its influence on soldiers returning from the trenches by the British government.

In Russia there at least two major contemporary sources of this kind of international pressure on the state. The first is the idea of democracy itself as a form of legitimation: Internationally this pressure has grown sharply over the last twenty-five years. Domestically, it remains weak, but is growing as a result of flawed elections and government intransigence.

The second major source of pressure (and one of more immediate concern to the leadership) is the need for scientific innovation, especially in terms of military applications. This is of course not new; Russia has been trying to catch up with the west since at least the time of Peter the Great. However, since 2008 we have seen a resurgence in this issue, as it has become apparent that Russia is falling further behind.

Indeed, this problem was the main driving force behind the “Russia 2020″ programme: First outlined in a speech given by Vladimir Putin in February 2008 (i.e just before the start of the Medvedev Presidency), “Russia 2020″ suggests three alternative scenarios, in terms of the potential trajectories of Russia’s economic development;

• The ”innovation” scenario. This presupposes the development of a national innovation system, competitive human capital, and regional development centers, and requires a comprehensive reform and investment programme.  It foresees an average annual GDP growth of 6.5%.
• The “energy and raw materials” scenario, which is based on faster development and modernization of the extractive sector, and projects an average annual growth of 5.3%.
• The ”inertia” scenario,” which assumes no significant improvement, and therefore forecasts an average growth rate of 3.9% per year.

In our opinion, while over the course of his presidency Dimitry Medvedev has genuinely attempted to put some flesh on the bones of the proposed “innovation” scenario (tax breaks, technology parks, abolishing import duties on high-tech equipment, trying to encourage foreign investment), over the last couple of years it has shown increasing signs that it is encountering resistance from within the ruling class.

The reason for this impasse is that many in the nomenklatura are opposed both to economic reform (which threatens their privileged positions) and even more so to the implied political changes which would be the backbone of an innovative economy.

In this regard, we consider Putin’s return to the presidency on 7th May as indicative of a broader reassertion of power by these interests, and an indication that they remain eager to avoid the potentially “destabilizing” effects of the political and economic reform required to both attract increased investment, and meaningfully achieve the “innovation” scenario.

Instead, they appear to be hoping that a continued recovery in hydrocarbon prices over the next few years will allow Russia to return to a greater emphasis on the second, ”energy and raw materials” development path, with its promise of a (still robust) 5.3% average annual growth.

They may or may not achieve this goal. But while such growth rates are impressive, especially when compared with a still crisis-ridden West, the inability to modernize which this choice implies suggests serious problems for Russia’s military capabilities: In the absence of innovation from within the domestic public or private sectors or from foreign investors, and with a continuing “brain-drain”, Russia’s aging cadre of engineers and largely soviet-era industrial base are falling behind.

As Alexander Golts wrote in Yezhednevny Zhurnal on 24th April, the leadership is now worried, “that the technological revolution sweeping the world could devalue their most important legacy from the Soviet era – its nuclear arsenal.” However, as he also correctly argues, “any serious reform in education or the defense industry “will eventually run up against Putin’s unyielding power vertical”.

Pressure from the international level is therefore increasingly making itself felt in Russia’s domestic politics: The opportunities for democratization, liberalization and innovation exist and all three are interconnected. However, the threat they pose to key vested interests make all equally unlikely. Instead we will more likely see “Potemkin reform”; pre-selected candidates for gubernatorial elections and a multiplicity of insignificant parties instead of democracy; promises, corruption and profligate spending instead of innovation.

But while you can ignore reality, you can’t ignore the results of ignoring reality: In the event that the Russian military were to face a humiliating defeat or serious setback over the coming years as a result of its increasing comparative backwardness, while growing demands for political change remain unanswered, the domestic political impact will be devastating.

April 24th 2012,

Democratist has sometimes been accused of being “theoretical.” We do not deny this charge. For us, using ”theory” means the ability to generalize rational insight from experience.  Although not without limitation, any attempt to explain (and by extension change) the world without some kind of rational framework will amount to little, and incautious abandonment leaves one vulnerable to a variety of intellectual hucksters (post-modernists, nationalists, religious dogmatists, conspiracy theorists…).

In terms of International Relations, the most fruitful theoretical tools Democratist has encountered are those drawn from historical-sociology. Part of the reason for this blog is to apply insights drawn from that tradition to the contemporary world.

This explains the repeated importance we have placed on the revolutions of Arab Spring. For us, 2011 was a year of global historical significance - like 1789, 1848, 1917 or 1989/1991. As with those other historically conjunctural years, 2011 combined elements that are central to our view of the world; social conflicts, mass movements and (democratic) revolution. However, the events of 2011 also involved an additional aspect that we have not yet covered in any detail, but which is a cornerstone of our approach, and of particular relevance to the political trajectory of the countries of the CIS; the idea of international society as “homogeneity.”

What do we mean by “international society” and ”homogeneity”?

Within the academic study of International relations over the last 40 years, there have been three main perspectives on what constitutes “international society”. These are;

i) It consists of relations between states (governments). Obvious examples include diplomacy and war.

ii) It consists of non-state links of economy, political association, culture and ideology (a favourite of “globalization” theorists).

iii) It consists of a set of ideological values shared by different societies and promoted by inter-state competition, producing international “homogeneity”.

While the first two perspectives are certainly essential to any understanding of international relations, and are regularly covered in the mainstream media, it is the third which comes from the historical-sociological tradition, and on which we focus here.

The basic idea of homogeneity is simple: As a result of international pressures, states are compelled through competition with one another over the long-term, to resemble each other more and more in their internal arrangements. Developments at the international level have an impact on the ideological legitimacy and stability of states domestically: Political and social change within countries have always been to some extent, and are now increasingly the result of external processes.

In Rethinking International Relations (1994), Fred Halliday uses this perspective to explain the end of the Cold War, or as he puts it, “…why a specific political and socio-economic system, one that was in broad terms equal to its rival in military terms, should have collapsed as it did, rapidly and unequivocally, and in the absence of significant international military conflict.”

Halliday argues that communism was successful, not only in the second world war, but in subsequent arms races and third world strategic competition. However, it was at the socio-economic level that the USSR came to be seen as a comparative failure, unable to match its Western competitors: By the 1980′s the domestic record of communism, as compared with its main capitalist alternatives, became a central dimension of Cold War rivalry, resulting in the Gorbachev’s attempts at reform, and the ultimate collapse of a unreformable system.

The key point is that it was an ideologically influenced change of direction by the leadership which brought about the USSR’s demise. Communism could easily have dragged on for another decade or two, but the leadership became convinced that the Soviet system was unable to catch up with the west, especially in terms of economic output and innovation. The subsequent opening of the USSR to foreign influences after 1988 as part of glasnost acted to alert the broader public to these problems, highlighting contrasts in living standards, which led to increased calls for change.

This brings us to the question of the extent that states have responded to international pressure to homogenize since 1991. For Democratist, it is clear that the idea of the democratic “good life” transmitted by popular culture, the media and, above all the internet, has become much more powerful over the last twenty years. Indeed, so powerful is this image, that leaders of many authoritarian countries have come to expend considerable resources in countering it with domestic and international propaganda (e.g. RT, Press TV etc).

International pressure for homogenization has therefore increased, with democracy taking on a far greater role as a factor for domestic legitimization and stability. The Arab Spring was witness to the growth of pressure for reform building due to a number of factors, but not least the example of comparatively politically and economically successful democratic countries. However, the regimes of the middle East proved resistant to reform, and therefore lost popular legitimacy and finally faced revolution.

Similar pressures have also manifested themselves in the former Soviet Union, with revolutions sparked off by rigged elections in a number of countries. However, in contemporary Russia, democratizing pressure remains weak as result the chaos and national humiliation of the 1990′s. This is commonly blamed on “dermokratiya,” while it was in fact actually more the result of the collapse of the command economy and massive corruption. And yet, as described in Masha Gessen’s The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (Granta Publications, 2012), the Russian government has shown no serious willingness to reform over the last decade, and the untreated corruption of the 1990′s has in fact worsened.

It therefore seems unlikely that the government will embark on meaningful reform over the coming years, whilst homogenizing pressure for change will grow: As the Russian middle class gains in political confidence it will begin to demand the representation it is afforded in other countries, spurred on by technological change.

And while the possibility of a gradual transition to a more representative political system remains, the probability of a political crisis over the longer term if this does not materialize is growing.

April 13th 2012,

Democratist has been interested to read that the Duma is to set up a new advisory “Counter-Revolutionary Council” within the parliamentary Committee for CIS Affairs.

According to the April 10th edition of Kommersant, “Moscow is looking for an antidote for colour revolutions and a means to strengthen its position in the post-Soviet zone… the Duma’s Committee is about to form a council that will be tasked to keep tabs on threats to the interests of Russia in nearby foreign countries and design counter-measures against colour revolutions.”

The key word here is of course, “interests.” The notion of “colour revolutions” (the idea that foreign NGOs are able to trick otherwise perfectly content populations to overthrow their autocratic rulers) is such obvious propaganda as to be unworthy of comment - if it were not for the fact that there are so many within the Russian media who remain happy to repeat this nonsense (and the fabricated kompromat which often accompanies it) without engaging any of their critical faculties.

The spectacle of a group of people who largely owe their positions to electoral fraud creating a parliamentary committee to ensure that other authoritarian regimes are able do the same without hinderance, and on the basis that the populations of other countries have been fooled into rejecting the “benign” guidance of autocrats by outside interference, reveal the hypocrisy and self-interest of the ruling elite. Many seem willing to stoop to any fabrication so they can continue to steal for as long as possible, and ensure their business associates and allies abroad are protected.

According to the “Counter-Revolutionary Council”  we are to believe that revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine were the work of American political technologists; but nothing is mentioned of the electoral fraud which was the primary motivation for both of these events: Nothing is said about the abuse of administrative resources by Shevardnadze and Kuchma, or the intimidation, busing, carousel voting and ballot stuffing which were so blatant (especially in the second round of voting in Ukraine in November 2004). We are told that the people who participated in the subsequent Orange Revolution did so for a few Yankee dollars, but nothing is said of the crowds of hundreds of thousands which thronged the center of Kiev during the first days of protest shouting, “No to falsification!” even though it was widely expected that armed interior ministry troops would try to retake the city within hours.

Above all, nothing is said about the position of the Russian government; Vladimir Putin’s open support for Yanukovich in the campaign, nor Russian media support, nor the sources of the funding of the anti-Yushenko black-PR newsheets which seemed to litter every post-meeting park and pavement in Eastern Ukraine back then.

In the creation of the “Counter-Revolutionary Council” we see the (now matured) notion of “colour revolution” for what it is; a deliberate exaggeration of the capabilities and influence of western-backed NGO’s in events which were actually sparked by electoral fraud, and which, more fundamentally, reflected deep social ruptures stemming from the inequalities and indignities of crony capitalism and authoritarianism. This line of propagandizing is not new, and its historical lineage includes examples from the work of the KGB, NKVD, and even the Okhrana. The establishment of this latest body represents an additional stage in the political exploitation of these fantasies, with the aim of justifying repression at home and potentially abroad: If United Russia cheats in domestic elections, the rhetoric of paranoia and the spectre of American interference can be trotted out as justification. If further revolutions occur in the “near abroad” and intervention is required to ensure the interests of the elite and the requirements of realpolitik, the same justification can be applied.

But the “antidote” to colour revolutions does not lie in Duma Committees or ”counter measures”. And it certainly doesn’t lie in military intervention; occupied populations quickly rebel.

The historical process of democratization that created the Rose and Orange Revolutions, and more recently the “Arab Spring” will eventually make its presence felt throughout the former Soviet space. As economies grow and populations become more connected with the outside world, this possibility becomes increasingly probable. But Russia must not make the same mistakes that the United States made in Afghanistan and Iraq: It must be wary of the temptation of ill-conceived foreign adventures on the basis of ideological myths (“Neo-conservatism” in the American case, “colour revolution in the Russian). Instead the “antidote” to colour revolutions lies in the acceptance of genuine democracy and self-determination both for Russia itself, and for the “near abroad”.

4th April 2012,

In a previous article, I described the argument that Russia’s elections are “more or less” democratic as one of the “legitimating myths” of Putinism [designed to bolster the regime and keep the population in check]. Unsurprisingly, this claim upset some readers, and they made a number of counter-arguments.

Their main points were;

• The current Russian government is, despite the fraud that took place in both parliamentary and presidential polls, broadly a reflection of the preferences and political goals of most Russians.
• “Western” democracy is not a universal value; there are many different styles of democracy and the current system in Russia represents an “acceptable” variation on the democratic theme, in line with Russian history and cultural norms.
• The “western” democratic model is not without its weaknesses and inefficiencies and does not solve problems such as corruption.
• The “non-systemic” opposition is weak and divided, especially the “pro-western” liberals. Some of these parties may be dependent on American money (witness the $200 million dollars spent by the American government on supporting Russian NGOs since 2009, with $50 million more apparently on the way). Liberalization would only benefit hard-core leftists, nationalists and liberal “traitors”.

These are interesting arguments, but not without some elements which characterize the “mythologising” to which I was referring. I will deal with each in turn:

The first point is essentially true. Vladimir Putin is popular, and would presumably have won the presidential election without falsification (although the fact that falsification did occur makes it hard to be 100% sure; the assurances of opinion polls will never be good as the “real thing,” i.e. a fair vote). However, the position of the party of “crooks and thieves” is far less secure, and it would not have won the (reduced) representation it now has in the Duma without considerable fraud in December. The current government may also broadly reflect the preferences and goals of a majority of Russians but, as is the nature of politics, there is no guarantee that this state of affairs will continue indefinitely, and as Russian society evolves it seems likely that there will ultimately come a point when the majority of Russians find themselves actively opposed to government policy.

More fundamental is the question of whether ”western” democracy is a universal value. From Democratist’s perspective, one of the main lessons to be learned from a (non-conspiratorial) analysis of the Arab Spring is that democracy, while “western” in origin, is increasingly coming to be seen as having universal applicability, and that “democracy” need not necessarily mean “Americanization” or “neo-liberalism.”  Recent events in the middle East have shown that the populations of countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria have risen up despite American hypocrisy on the issue of democratization. These people are demanding respect and representation for themselves in their own countries regardless of any “Freedom Agenda” or other rhetoric. Democratization is not simply an American plot (although the Americans, just like other major powers will doubtless seek to influence these processes), but is rather reflective of historical-social developments taking place in many countries, and so it is to be hoped that the polities which emerge from these revolutions will reflect the sovereignty, national character and priorities of their people.

Furthermore, the idea that the world is divided into incomparable moral blocs or civilizations has taken a huge blow over the last 18 months. While the cynics have sought to paint the Arab Spring as harbinger of anti-western Islamist autocracy, there have been significant historical-social trends in the region over the last 40 years which suggest that this will not be the case: The large majority of arab Islamists are not calling for the establishment of revolutionary islamic states, but rather the creation of a “civil state” [i.e one which, while not secular, has many democratic elements, including free and fair elections].

So, while the last fifteen years may have been witness to democratic stagnation or reversal in the CIS, on the global scale, the last two centuries (and especially the last seventy years) demonstrate the growing potency of democratic ideals, and the erosion of autocracy as a legitimate form of governance, even in “unexpected” places, and (more recently) regardless of American rhetoric: Democratist contends that a set of shared values is slowly emerging throughout the world, including democracy, human rights, the defence of national sovereignty and a belief in the benefits of economic development, even though this has taken place during a period in which some of these values have come under pressure in the United States: They may have originated in the West, but in responding to basic human aspirations and social change within the context of the spread of capitalism, their potential applicability is growing ever wider.

This brings us to the question of whether the current political system in Russia is just a variation on the democratic theme; one, moreover, which is in line with Russian history and cultural norms. This is, of course ultimately a question for the Russian people to answer, rather than any outsider, and (again) American lecturing on this issue has proved remarkably counter-productive over recent years. Nonetheless, it has to be said that there are strong arguments which suggest that the current system, while popular with a majority of Russians, does not meet the basic criteria of democracy. As an example, the OSCE ODIHR (an organization of which the Russian government is both a member and occasional participant) reports the following problems with recent parliamentary and presidential elections; technical restrictions on who was able to stand, a biased electoral administration dominated by the ruling party at all levels, the partiality of most media, and ballot stuffing on election day. It is up to Russians themselves to decide whether they feel that these problems match existing Russian “cultural norms,” and if they do, the extent to which such “norms” are worth preserving, or should be changed.

As for corruption, it is certainly true to say that no political system can eliminate it completely. However, it must also be admitted that institutionalized democracy, with a firmly established rule of law and independent legal system has proved a more effective guard against corruption than the current Russian system. By many accounts Russia is the most corrupt industrialized country in the world; Vladimir Putin’s friends from his Saint Petersburg youth and the Ozero dacha collective are worth billions. Indeed the current system is so entrenched that it may prove unreformable until a change in the political or economic situation provokes a collapse.

Finally, the question of the non-systemic opposition. Yes. The opposition is weak and divided, sometimes extreme, and possibly reliant on American money (although I still require some convincing on this point). Additionally, American calls for increased funding for NGOs are helping to stoke growing government paranoia. But on the other hand, the current system (deliberately) stifles debate and does little to encourage the development of Russian NGOs. It seems unlikely that President Medvedev’s recent changes to the law on registration of parties will make much difference to this situation. And while it might be possible, with institutional safeguards in place such as an independent legal system, “fair and balanced” requirements for the media etc, to create the basis for wider debate and eventual genuine elections, on the basis of recent history we are unlikely to see these wider structures in place anytime soon.

2nd April 2012,

In my last article I discussed the issue of the idea of “colour revolutions” as a “legitimizing myth” of Putinism, arguing that it is far easier for the current Russian government to blame the revolts which have taken place in the “near abroad” and middle East over the past few years on various invented (usually western-backed) ”conspiracies” than to accept the increasing anachronism of their autocratic model of governance in the contemporary world.

To nobody’s surprise, this article naturally resulted in yet more conspiracy theory. Did I not know who was “really” behind these events? Who was my article “cooked up” for, and to what end? Surely I was working for [inserted prefered conspiracy here].

It therefore occurred to me that there exists a contemporary demand for an explanation of why (especially) the Arab Spring has taken place; one which might provide a more rational alternative to the fantasies of those whose stock-in-trade is obfuscation and paranoia. Fortunately, an existing theoretical framework with a long scholarly pedigree already exists; that of historical-sociology.

Historical sociology takes much of its inspiration from The Sociological Imagination, a book by the American Sociologist C. Wright Mills (1959), which (drawing on Marxism), underscores the centrality of historically specific social structures (patterns of social relationships over time) for sociology in particular, and the social sciences in general. Within the field of International Relations, the historical-sociological school has been developing since the mid-1980′s.

For the practitioners of the Historical Sociology, the key factors behind the Arab Spring are to be found, not in fanciful foreign plots, but rather in sociological developments which have taken place within societies in the region over recent decades: These include tremendous upheavals provoked by poverty, the evident injustice of “crony capitalism” (abject poverty side by side with decadent wealth), the rising expectations of the (literate and technically savvy) young; the delayed flowering of civil society, and finally the rupturing of corrupt political, economic and social systems dominated by authoritarian cliques (and supported by both Russia and the West in many cases for decades).

The place to look for serious analysis the origins of these events is therefore in the tensions which have occurred within these societies over recent years, rather than in the baseless propagandizing of ”foreign interference”. While it may be true that the “great powers” have sought to extend or protect their interests as a result of the initial uprisings (for example, overthrowing Gaddafi in the western case, or seeking to protect Assad in the Russian and Iranian), outside forces were clearly not the initial cause of these uprisings. Indeed, they appear to have taken place despite repeated American hypocrisy on the issue of democratization: The populations in these countries have not been swayed by the fact that the US talks the language of democracy whilst employing the stratagems of realpolitik; rather they are demanding respect and representation at home regardless of (often empty) American rhetoric.

However, this focus on internal developments and rejection of conspiracy-as-explanation does not mean that “international” factors were absent in the Arab Spring. In fact, structural international factors, such as the place of these countries within the global economy, were critically important in the influence they had on promoting the drive for accelerated development witnessed over the last few decades: If these revolutions have been organized through social media; Facebook, Twitter and so on, then the reasons why many of these countries have experienced large expansions in literacy, education, foreign languages and computing skills lies in the positions that they came to assume within global economic and security structures in a globalizing world, and the desire of local elites to improve those positions.

From an even broader historical viewpoint, as Fred Halliday points out in Revolutions and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power. (Palgrave, 1999), over the last three centuries, the focus of revolutionary upheavals has not been on the most developed states, but rather revolutions have tended to occur in less developed countries, and during periods in which the “conflicts of modernity” were at their sharpest, with these states only subsequently settling down into democratic reformism. It is at this stage of development that the countries of the Arab Spring now find themselves; driven towards revolution, not by conspiracy, but rather by the pressures placed on existing societies by international structural factors, and the subsequent drive for accelerated development at home.

In conclusion, the obvious question to ask is the extent to which this mixture of domestic and international pressures applies to Russia as well? Russia does not lack a corrupt, inefficient and un-innovative brand of crony capitalism, or the rising expectations of the technologically capable and politically-concious young (especially in the urban centers). Nor is the government indifferent to Russia’s position in the world. On the other hand, exploding oil wealth has meant poverty has decreased greatly over the past decade, and Russians are richer and freer than at almost any other point in their history. The demographic situation is different (fewer young people), and “democracy” is associated with the chaos of the 1990′s. As long as the oil price remains high, economic growth will continue, and the Putin systema remain stable. However, a sharp and sustained dip in hydrocarbon prices would certainly make Russian political life much more complex, and potentially lead to greater change as Russian society evolves.

23rd March 2012,

Since 2000, Russia has increasingly come to be governed by the use of propaganda as a method for ensuring the legitimation of the regime and keeping the population in check. A series of half-truths, exaggerations and myths have been created to this end, each of which bears the none too subtle whiff of the work of political technologists; that Russia’s elections are “more or less” democratic; that the country only suffers from “civilized” levels of corruption; that Skolkovo will make Russia’s economy a globally competitive center of innovation within a few years; that the Duma is an institution that dutifully scrutinizes legislation on behalf of the electorate; that political and economic reform is ”just around the corner…”

But perhaps the overarching legitimation myth of Putinism is idea of the “Colour Revolution,” the notion that the processes of revolt and democratization which have taken place in the near abroad and (more recently) middle East over the past decade are part of some all-powerful, hydra-headed American conspiracy, aimed at “destroying Russia” (and incidentally, world domination). Indeed, according to this narrative we are to believe that those perfidious Americans work day and night to confound otherwise perfectly content populations into overthrowing such beloved (and, of course, free and fairly elected) leaders as Milosevic, Yanukovich, Mubarak, Gaddafi and Assad.

The rationale behind the promotion of such theories is an unwillingness to accept the growing appeal of democratic governance to people in autocratic states generally, and of the applicability of the democratic model to Russia specifically. The need for the continued promotion of such a view of the world is dictated by the elite’s unwillingness to relax their grip on power domestically, or allow themselves to be put to the test of a genuinely fair election (regardless of how popular the opinion polls say they are). It is far easier to ascribe an unwarranted role in these revolts to the CIA, George Soros, the Bilderburg group or whoever, than to accept that the autocratic model of governance, while currently popular in Russia,  has a very limited shelf life in the absence of high oil revenues, and has been rejected by the populations of at least a dozen countries over the last decade.

In terms of the implications of this we might expect for Russia’s domestic political development over the coming years, the continued employment of conspiracy theory as a means of control does not bode well. It is unlikely that the government will allow any genuine political alternatives to emerge to the current system whilst it also tars them, at the same time, as agents of foreign influence. This makes an eventual peaceful transition of power less likely.

A related problem is that Russian history already has several examples which demonstrate that where conspiracy is given prominence, there is a strong tendency that eventually even the leadership and security organs will come to believe their own inventions.

In Voodoo Histories: How Conspiracy Theory has Shaped Modern History (2009) the British author David Aaronovich gives the example of the so-called Protocols of the Elders of Zion; a forged document supposedly describing how senior representatives of the Jewish community were plotting to achieve world domination, which was in fact cooked-up by the Okhrana in the early 1900′s as a weapon to bolster tsarist autocracy against reformism (many reformist politicians were Jews).

Another example of the NKVD’s (as it was by then called) handiwork can be seen in the Moscow “show trials” of the late 1930′s. During these trials several senior party members were coerced into implicating themselves in a complex series of conspiracies apparently intended to derail Soviet industrialization and overthrow Stalin in favour of the exiled Leon Trotsky. Needless to say (as was later admitted), no such plots ever existed; they were invented by the NKVD in order to consolidate Stalin’s grip on power, provide excuses for the numerous shortcomings of the first 5-year plan, and pander to the leader’s own deep personal paranoia. As Robert Conquest has described in The Great Terror (1968/1991), many millions died in the subsequent purges.

What is important in both cases is that eventually those in power in Russia came to believe the fictions they had created were true: In The Mitrokhin Archive (a document whose veracity and accuracy never been officially denied, more than a decade after publication), Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin recount that many among the KGB senior ranks still fully believed in the existence of Zionist plots well into the 1960′s and 1970′s. Similarly, many in the nomenklatura genuinely believed in the truth of the “show trials,” and supported the purges up until Khrushchev’s “secret speech” in 1956.

Therefore we should perhaps not be too surprised at the anger in Prime Minister Putin’s voice, and the tears which streamed down his face during his otherwise carefully choreographed acceptance speech on the Manezhka earlier this month. His invocation of outside forces trying to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs may seem contrived to the foreign observer, especially after what the OSCE described as a poll which was “clearly skewed in favour of one of the contestants.” But, old chekist that he is, the possibility remains that Russia’s old-new President has come to genuinely believe in the myths that have been invented over the years by his colleagues in order to ensure he retains his grip on power.

Additional note: I have just added a link for the Wikipedia page for The Mitrokhin Archive. Oddly enough, there is no Russian translation of this page.  I wonder why?

March 19th 2012,

In the wake of the presidential elections, commentators across Russia and the world have been asking how Vladimir Putin will govern Russia in his third term. How will he respond to the rise of an increasingly critical urban middle class? Is he about to recast himself as a reformer (“Putin 2.0″), or will he crack down on the unrest as a populist autocrat? Finally, will he imitate reform but actually maintain the status quo?

A mixture of the last two options looks most plausible. The rhetoric of reform will be pushed once again to the fore but the system will remain unchanged. Just as was the case with the Medvedev “liberalization,” ”Putin 2.0″ looks likely to prove a non-starter; a convenient lie designed to provide the illusion that change may on the way in a society that is (mostly) aware that this is not true, but also one where many people are keen to keep up the pretence of reform.

In this regard, it is not much of an exaggeration to say that political and economic reform in contemporary Russia are “being implemented” in the same way that the communist utopia was “just a few years away” during the late Soviet period. In both cases this narrative serves the same purpose: A legitimizing tool that can be trotted out by those with an interest in keeping the existing system in place in the face of popular scepticism. In both cases the message is essentially the same; you are part of a “greater project”; stay the course; things will improve gradually; there is no need to rock the boat.

But the fact that issues of property rights, the promotion of small and medium-sized business culture, and especially corruption persist after 12 years of Putin strongly suggests that serious change is unlikely. Indeed, for an indication of the source of much of Russia’s corruption, we need look no further than Angus Roxburgh’s analysis of the extraordinary good fortunes of Vladimir Putin’s friends from his Saint Petersburg youth, and the Ozero dacha collective. (Strongman, I.B. Tauris 2012). Arkady and Boris Rotenburg, Putin’s erstwhile judo partners, each now have assets worth $1.75 billion. Yuri Kovalchuk, from the Ozero collective is worth just under a billion dollars. There are many other similar examples.

More broadly, Roxburgh notes, “…by far the biggest obstacle to foreign investment (or the creation of an international financial center in Russia) can be summed up in one word – corruption – a word so complex that one leading Russian businessman told me I would never, as a Westerner understand it. “Theft,” he said, “is not theft as you know it. It is the entire system – the political system, the business establishment, the police, the judiciary, the government, from top to bottom, all intertwined and inseparable.”"

In this regard, Professor Alena Ledeneva (of University Collage London) has argued that the Putin corruption systema is fundamentally unreformable, and will remain in place until a change in the political or economic situation provokes a collapse. Given the evidence presented above, the continued popularity of the government, and the involvement of large sections of Russian society in various corruption networks, the re-election of Vladimir Putin is unlikely to herald a period of reform. Rather, a better case can be made that Putin has become captive to a system he helped to create, and will be unable to introduce the reforms Russia needs without alienating these constituencies.

Nonetheless, change is certainly coming, because the middle class is growing, and Russian society is changing. But the tipping point is years away. The oil price is again on the rise, and so social spending can remain high. This will be enough to placate large parts of the population. Many people are living materially better lives, and indeed have more freedom than Russians have enjoyed throughout almost all of their history.

Additionally the current system has the backing of the FSB, an organization which acts in a manner closer to an arab mukhabarat than western Security Services, and which sees the protection of the regime as a key priority. Therefore, in addition to the (already evident) shift towards renewed state media restrictions and manipulation, the FSB will not hesitate to use all of the many tools at its disposal (surveillance, subversion, kompromat) to ensure the opposition remains weak, divided and marginalized.