Democratist

Democracy. Russia. CIS.

Archive for the ‘European Union’ Category

Whispers of change in Tiraspol.

Posted by democratist on May 31, 2011

May 31st 2011,

Rumours are circulating in Tirsapol, capital of the unrecognized breakaway Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) of a change in political leadership at the next Presidential elections, due in December.

The PMR has been run by former Communist appartchik, Igor Smirnov, since the conflict which led to its succession from the rest of Moldova in 1992, and, since that time, has developed an international reputation as a hotbed of smuggling, corruption and authoritarianism.

But while any meaningful attempt to address these problems is unlikely in a place where a handful of people own almost the entire economy, and there is no real history of free or fair elections, at least some superficial alteration among the current leadership may be in the offing.

The reason behind this trend is a newly heightened pressure from Russia, which retains 1200 peacekeepers in the PMR, and (so it is said) wants the intransigent Smirnov out of the way so they can move forward with a plan to bring the frozen Transnistria conflict closer to resolution.

This, in turn, is seen as a first step as part of a controversial broader proposed deal with the German government, contained in the “Meseberg Memorandum” (signed by Chancellor Merkel and President Medvedev last June) which could potentially give Russia an enhanced voice in the EU’s security decision-making bodies.

A possible liberalization of visa restrictions for Russians entering the Schengen zone may be an additional incentive.

Apart from the rumours, another, more concrete indication of Russian intentions is that formal internationally brokered negotiations on a settlement of the PMR’s status are expected to reconvene at a meeting in Moscow on 21st June, after a break of some five years.

But while the formal resumption of negotiations would certainly be a step in the right direction,  Smirnov’s ouster, if and when it comes, is likely to be a more significant indicator of Russian seriousness in relation to moving the process forward, and it will be interesting to see how things progress following the selection and announcement of Presidential candidates in September.

Democratist remains sceptical about the extent to which other EU members will be willing to accept any Russian influence over their foreign policies in the coming years. But we hope that some tentative peaceful move towards a resolution of the current stalemate, combined with a change at the top (even a stage-managed one) will nudge the long-suffering Transnistrian people (unemployment is 49%, and 80% in the villages) a little closer towards considering the possibility of eventually taking their destiny into their own hands.

Posted in European Union, Moldova, Russia and the EU, Russia Foreign Policy, Transnistria, Western Foreign Policy | Leave a Comment »

Moldova’s 2011 Local Elections will confirm its European Orientation.

Posted by democratist on May 27, 2011

It will be harder for Moldova to join the EU that it was for neighbouring Romania, but Moldovan society has already made its preferences clear.

27th May 2011,

Moldova remains in a state of political upheaval initiated by the inability of the Communists to win the constitutionally required 61 seats to elect a President in the April 2009 parliamentary elections. The two years since then have seen several additional early votes – the last in November – but while the three-party coalition that forms the ruling Alliance for European Integration (AIE) has gained a few more MP’s each time, they still have only 59, and so are unable to elect one of their number to the presidency.

Marian Lupu (former Communist rising star and now leader of the breakaway Democratic Party) has filled the role of acting President since December. He looks set to do so for some months to come, especially since the constitutional court decided in February that it was not necessary for the government to hold a vote to appoint a new President within two months of the resignation of the last one (and did not provide an alternate time frame).

And yet a new set of elections early next year remains a possibility: Two rounds of municipal polls are due on 5th and 19th June. If the AIE, and especially Vlad Filat’s Liberal Democrats perform well (as expected), and the Communists lose control of one of the larger cities currently under their sway, then Filat may decide to have another crack at the top job.

In the meantime, it looks unlikely that either of his two AIE partners (Lupu’s Democrats or Mihai Ghimpu’s Liberals) will seek to block his path to power by cutting a deal with the Communists: They would almost certainly be seen as traitors to the cause of Moldova’s European integration (supported by about 70% of the population), and would suffer badly at the next election.

However, this might change if the fallout from the local polls provoke a challenge to Vladimir Voronin’s leadership of the Communists. If Igor Dodon, their mayoral candidate in Chisinau does well, while the Party’s vote in the rest of Moldova declines, then the young, centrist Dodon may make a bid to take control of the Party from the septuagenarian Voronin. This in turn would make the Communists a much more acceptable prospect for a possible deal with one or more of the AIE coalition partners.

But whether the current coalition continues, or the Liberal Democrats, or (less likely) a new coalition including Lupu and Dodon comes out on top, it seems implausible the EU’s generous financial support to Moldova will dry up any time soon: Corruption remains a serious problem with has still not been properly addressed, but in terms of progress towards democratization, media freedom and civil society, as well as prospects for co-operation with the EU on issues such as border controls and visa regularization, Moldova’s prospects are notably better than those of fellow EU Eastern Partnership members Belarus or Ukraine. This is not likely to change, given the demographic situation as expressed in the last three parliamentary elections (older Communist voters are dying off, and are not being replaced by many younger ones).

On this basis, the political and sociological foundation for Moldova’s continued EU orientation will remain in place. This is a positive development which, combined with increased free trade, and ongoing remittances from the EU, will do much to propel already robust economic growth (6.9% last year) and lead to the continued entrenchment of Moldova’s remarkably vibrant democracy. However, given enlargement fatigue and economic malaise, as well as the ongoing Transnistria issue, while the EU may be able to provide some additional incentives over the next few years, it looks like Moldova’s path to membership may still take several decades.

Posted in Democratization, EU Enlargment, European Union, Historical Sociology of International Relations (HSIR), Moldova | 2 Comments »

Ukraine may be turning back towards the EU, but integration remains a distant prospect.

Posted by democratist on May 18, 2011

18th May 2011,

Democratist has spent the past couple of days in Odessa, where he met a new contact who seems to know everyone worth knowing there, and certainly talks a good game.

Our new friend informs us that the next 18 months are about to witness a significant and decisive shift in Ukrainian foreign policy.

Apparently, the intensified wave of high-level corruption since Yanukovich came to power last year is essentially a final fight over the spoils as part of a prelude to a new period of Ukraine making a concerted effort to deepen its relationship with the EU. This in turn will lead to enhanced domestic reform, a clampdown on corruption, and an unequivocal return to the path of democratization.

In this regard, the PoR’s key aims over the coming months are the completion of an EU Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) by the end of he year, and the agreement of a much simplified visa regime for Ukrainian Citizens visiting the EU next summer (perhaps to coincide with Ukraine’s joint hosting of Euro 2012 with Poland in June/July). The PoR believes that the successful conclusion of these agreements would give it a considerable (and badly needed) boost in the October 2012 parliamentary elections.

This renewed concentration on EU integration comes after Ukraine ignored Russia’s invitation to join its Customs Union in late April, despite Putin’s promises that Ukraine would earn an additional $6.5 billion to $9 billion per annum from the deal. It has been rumoured for some time that the oligarchy that funds the PoR has come to see the Russian “virtual mafia state” as a key threat to its own independence (although this does not automatically make them keen Europeans, or mean that they will easily accept restrictions on their own activities). Additionally, according to almost everyone Democratist has spoken to, there is considerable popular sentiment throughout the country that Ukraine will be far better off as an independent state than it would be as a glorified southern province of Russia. More specifically, the pro-European policy is being driven to a considerable extent by the First Deputy Head of the presidential administration, the economist Irina Akimova.

From Democratist’s perspective, Ukraine’s timely completion of the Association Agreement and DCFTA would be most welcome, as it would prove beneficial to both the European and Ukrainian economies and set the stage for further integration. If these negotiations are indeed successfully completed by the end of the year then it certainly would make a great deal of sense to reward the government with a relaxation of the EU’s visa requirements next summer (provided all required criteria are met) with a view to scrapping visa requirements entirely for Ukrainians over the medium term. The current tight restrictions are very unpopular in Ukraine, with many people feeling that they are being treated more like potential criminals, than potential “Europeans”.

However, further progression towards full integration beyond that point is clearly going to take some time, and the current situation is not very promising. A critical indication of whether Yanukovich is really serious about Ukraine’s eventual European orientation will come during the conduct of the parliamentary elections next October: If domestic and international observers conclude that these are run in a free and fair manner (with none of the problems witnessed in the municipal polls last year), if the media and judicial situations show sharp improvements, if there is no abuse of “administrative resources”, if the rumours that the PoR is secretly funding the nationalist Svoboda Party in Western Ukraine suddenly cease, and if Tymoshenko does not discover that she is unable to contest the poll because she is in prison on politically-motivated charges, then even the more reluctant EU member-states will have to concede that Yanukovich is someone who means to transform Ukraine, and with whom they should do business.

Posted in EU Enlargment, European Union, Russia-Ukraine Relations, Ukraine, Ukrainian Corruption, Western Foreign Policy | 3 Comments »

Decision time for Moldova’s Constitutional Court.

Posted by democratist on February 8, 2011

8th February 2010,

An interesting day for those of us who concern ourselves with the (rather convoluted) domestic politics of Moldova;

Itar-Tass reports that the constitution court is due to hold a session to decide the time limits by which the president should be elected by parliamentary vote.

This was brought about through an appeal from the Moldovan Communist party (PCRM). They believe Moldovan Constitutional law requires a vote be held within two months of the resignation of the last holder of the post (in this case Mihai Ghimpu, who resigned on December 28, 2010).

But figures from the governing Alliance for European Integration (AIE) claim that this provision does not apply in the case of an interim President being in place, and that therefore there need not be any deadline in the situation as it exists at the moment, with the AEI’s Marian Lupu filling the interim role.

If the court decides that a vote does indeed need to take place within two months (i.e. by February 28th), it seems unlikely that the Communists will provide the two additional votes the AIE require to reach the sixty-one vote threshold. Instead of Lupu being officially appointed President, the most likely outcome is that he would continue in the interim role, and the country will return to the polls for the fourth time in three years, in early 2012.

However if they accept the AEI’s position, it looks as if Moldova might be able to muddle along under the current arrangement for the full length of a presidential term (i.e. until 2014).

Either way, Moldova looks likely to remain the object of ongoing geopolitical jockeying from both Russia and the EU. The Russians are currently touting cheap gas (possibly in return for basing rights), whereas the Europeans have offered a comprehensive trade deal as part of an Association Agreement.

Posted in Democratization, Elections, European Union, Moldova, Russian Foreign Policy, Western Foreign Policy | 1 Comment »

Moldova 2011: A Renewed Opportunity for EU Diplomacy.

Posted by democratist on January 7, 2011

7th January 2010,

Democratist has continued to take a keen interest in Russia and the EU’s geopolitical manoeuverings following the November 27th elections in Moldova. While several polls in the CIS in 2010 have been broadly perceived as “successes” in terms of Russian foreign policy (Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus) Democratist sees the current situation in Moldova as holding out at least a little hope for European influence in the former Soviet space.

In the first half of December both Russia and the EU offered alternative trade deals,designed to sway the formation of potential coalitions to their own advantage during the period of negotiation that followed the inconclusive poll: Russian presidential chief of staff Nariskin, hoping for a deal between the traditionally pro-Moscow Communists (PCRM) and Marian Lupu’s Democrats offered inclusion in Russia’s proposed customs union, as well as cheaper gas and a resumption of banned Moldovan wine imports. Meanwhile, attempting to encourage a continuation of the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) which had run the country since September 2009, the EU pushed its association agreement as a path towards more comprehensive free trade, and a proposed visa liberalization plan, while leaving the prospect of eventual Moldovan accession to hover in the background.

On 30th December, having failed to come to an arrangement with the Communists, the Democratic Party agreed to the re-establishment of the AIE; Lupu was elected speaker of Parliament and, in the absence of two of the 61 votes required by the constitution for election to the substantive post, appointed to replace Liberal leader Mihai Ghimpu as acting President. The AIE has not yet attempted to have Lupu formally elected to the presidency, since under the constitution a new parliamentary vote would have to take place if this is not a success. Instead, Prime Minister designate Vlad Filat has suggested the coalition may offer the Communists a ministerial post in the new cabinet in exchange for the two additional votes required.

It remains to be seen if the PCRM will take Filat up on his offer. They have not been willing to do so in the past and complained that the November elections were rigged (despite a thumbs up from the OSCE). If they decide against, another election seems inevitable by the end of 2011 unless a loophole can be found. However, since the electorate is unlikely to thank the Communists for having put them to the trouble of voting four times in under three years, such a strategy would not be without some risk.

As for the Russians, from what Democratist can gather from a recent article in RIA Novosti’s Russia Profile, their mood seems to have shifted over the past few weeks to a mixture of disappointment at the Communists’ waning popularity and inability to form a coalition (implying some loss of influence), a belief that Russia’s continued position as a source of remittances for Moldova will act as a counterweight to that trend, and the hope that Marian Lupu will be someone they could work with. There is also an unwillingness to allow relations with Moldova to sour the more important relationship with the EU.

And so the ball is now back in the EU’s court: Moldova may have to return to the polls at the end of 2011 or, with the support of the PCRM Lupu may be elected to a five-year term as President, but either way an opportunity now exists to show other CIS countries such as Ukraine and Belarus, what it is possible for an impoverished country like Moldova to accomplish through an improved relationship with the EU.

It is time to see whether those free-trade and visa liberalization plans are all just talk – or not.

Posted in Elections, European Union, Moldova, OSCE, Russia Foreign Policy | 1 Comment »

Moldova’s New Government: Still on a Knife-Edge

Posted by democratist on December 27, 2010

27th December 2010,

The month following the 28th November 2010 parliamentary elections in Moldova has proved fascinating in terms of Moldova’s own domestic coalition-building, but equally because the EU and Russia have both been jockeying, more or less openly, to influence that process.

With the first session of the new parliament due to take place tomorrow, and the election results finally approved by the constitutional court, horse-trading among the parliamentary political parties has reached fever pitch over the last couple of days.

The situation is on a knife-edge, and hard to predict, but following a period of several weeks during which it seemed that Marian Lupu’s Democratic Party might be able to form a coalition with the Communists (PCRM), those talks have stalled, and the main focus appears to have shifted back towards the reestablishment of the Alliance for European Integration (AIE), which has ruled the country since September 2009.

Although rarely reported in the mainstream Western press, these recent negotiations in Moldova have been closely observed by both EU and Russian diplomats; a Communist MP until 2009, Lupu has always been markedly more pro-Russian than the other two AIE leaders, and the PCRM themselves have retained their traditional pro-Russian stance with leader Vladimir Voronin stating in early December that Moldova might accede to Russia’s proposed customs union (as Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus recently agreed to do), as well as engage in a “deeper strategic partnership,” should the PCRM manage to form a coalition.

As such, it was hardly a surprise that Russian presidential chief of staff Sergey Nariskin visited Chisinau a few days later, offering cheaper gas and a resumption of banned Moldovan wine imports if the parties were able to form a pro-Moscow government.

Meanwhile, the EU have also played their hand in the form of a subsequent visit by Swedish and Polish Foreign Ministers Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, apparently designed to shore-up support for a pro-EU coalition.

Bildt is reported as having later commented, “What there is on the European agenda for Moldova is the association agreement. If you look at what the Moldovan economy needs, it is deep and comprehensive free trade with the EU. That is what can over time lead to a better development of what is today the poorest country in Europe. I’m not saying that cheap gas is bad, but economies and prosperity can’t be built on cheap gas.”

So both sides have mapped out their visions of Moldova’s future. Democratist (unsurprisingly) recommends the adoption of the European model as the best option for eventual political and economic reform, but the situation remains fluid, and coalition negotiations could still go either way.

Posted in Elections, European Union, Moldova, Russian Foreign Policy | 1 Comment »

Pro-EU forces gaining ground in Moldova.

Posted by democratist on December 3, 2010

3rd December 2010,

Democratist is mulling over the results of last Sunday’s parliamentary elections in Moldova; the small, very poor, and often overlooked former Soviet Republic wedged geographically between Romania and Ukraine, and geopolitically between the EU and Russia.

The 28th November poll is the third inconclusive vote to have taken place in the country since April 2009, and on each occasion no political group has been able to muster the 61 MPs (out of a total of 101) required by the constitution to elect the President.

However, despite the ongoing deadlock, these polls do seem to mark a continuing and considerable shift in political power and popular support in Moldova over the past 18 months.

While Vladimir Voronin’s PCRM Communists (who ruled Moldova between 2001-2009) have managed to remain a blocking minority of 42 seats in parliament, this most recent poll bears witness to the rapidly growing popularity of Prime Minister Vlad Filat’s Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (LDPM), which took almost 30% of the vote (compared with 12.4% as recently as April last year).

The LDPM has therefore somewhat eclipsed the its two remaining partners in the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) bloc that came to power in 2009 (which both took around 10%) but the LDPM’s growing popularity also seems to reflect a broader consolidation of pro-European forces, and a sharp decline in support for the Communists, in polls that were described as meeting most international commitments by the OSCE.

Democratist hopes that given this setback, the PCRM might see some sense, and come to an agreement with the other parties to allow for the election of a new Moldovan President (although this currently seems unlikely).

Furthermore, we hope the EU will also take note of the implications of these results, and continue to use all the tools at their disposal (including liberalized visa regime, trade agreement etc.) to push for the continued strengthening of democracy, and implementation of structural reforms in Moldova.

Posted in Democratization, Elections, European Union, Moldova | 3 Comments »

Belarus: The Geopolitics of the “Black Revolution.”

Posted by democratist on November 23, 2010

23rd November 2010.

More evidence is beginning to emerge of the Russian government’s all-but-openly-declared plotting to oust President Alexandr Lukashenko during, or shortly after the Belarussian Presidential elections due on 19th December.

In this regard, last Sunday Russia’s Channel One (also widely available in Belarus) ran a propaganda piece relating to the pre-election situation.

This declared that Lukashenko was “weaker today than he has ever been before” due to Belarus’ economic and other problems, and predicted that the country will likely face a currency crisis early in the new year.

More significantly, the programme (Vremya) also attempted to pull off what we can only describe as an impressive attempt at doublethink, as it tried to paint the EU as having been supportive of Lukashenko (employing a recent ill-judged quote by Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite) while Russia was recast as a stalwart defender of the Belarussian opposition (or at least of two pro-Russian opposition presidential candidates; Andrei Sannikov and Stanislau Shushkevich).

Thus, Sannikov was quoted as saying (in a line presumably scripted in Moscow),“We should proceed from the real situation. If Europe speaks about supporting Lukashenko, while Russia speaks about the opposition, we should take this into account and welcome it.”

And Shushkevich was permitted to chip-in with a spot of rabble-rousing anti-Lukashenko xenophobia; “You know, I have only Belarusians among my ancestors. [Lukashenko's] nationality is unknown: maybe he is of Roma origin, or of Jewish origin. In any case, he is definitely not a Belarusian.”

So, a fascinating scenario is emerging: The Belarusian electoral administration is massively dominated at all levels by Lukashenko loyalists. It is no exaggeration to say that the Territorial Electoral Commissions (TECs), which oversee the key organizational aspects of the process have been specifically designed to allow them to co-operate with local authorities (since they are largely composed of the same people) to allow them to use their influence in universities, hospitals and Belarus’ many state-enterprises (who employ 51.2% of the workforce) so as to both “get out the vote”, and pressure individuals to vote for the incumbent.

As long as this system remains functioning, there is no chance of any opposition figure being declared winner of the Presidential elections. Even if it does break down to some degree, the most popular Belarusian opposition politician (according to the independent IISEPS research centre) Russian-backed Vladimir Neklyaev, currently has only 16.8% of support in the opinion polls, while Lukashenko remains the most popular with support from about 48% of the electorate, regardless of recent external media pressure. Additionally, Sannikov himself is currently polling about 8.6%, with Romanchuk’s taking about 6.1% and Mikhalevich’s on 6.4%.

Thus, the most likely outcome is still a Lukashenko victory in the first round. While a second round run-off remains a possibility, we suspect that the key move (if it comes) will have to be during the days immediately after the first round poll, presumably in the shape of a coup dressed-up as some kind of popular revolution (a “Black” revolution), with one of the opposition candidates as a figurehead.

For the most part, the West, which (as the history of much of the last two decades has demonstrated) has limited political or economic  influence in Belarus, will be forced to watch from the sidelines as the drama unfolds; their main strategy (apart from calling for a transparent vote) is likely to be to act as quickly as possible to build up an enhanced relationship with the most likely future “candidates” (although these may be somewhat reluctant to play along, because they know Russia remains the only serious player).

If they do decide to go ahead with such a scheme, the Russians will be gambling that the US and EU are unwilling to risk the recent political and strategic advantages they have secured from the “reset,” to a lengthy spat over a coup in a country over which they have never had any significant control.

Posted in Belarus, European Union, Russia Foreign Policy, US - Russia | Leave a Comment »

Azerbaijani Democracy and Europe’s Gas Supplies

Posted by democratist on November 10, 2010

10th November 2010,

Democratist has been disappointed, but not surprised by the conduct of Azerbaijan’s parliamentary elections last Sunday, 7th November.

The results, and the way in which they were obtained, reflect a long, and now deepening tradition of post-Soviet authoritarian rule there. 

As far as we can gauge, all the standard dirty tricks were applied in abundance (media manipulation, voter intimidation, ballot-box stuffing etc.) in what was basically a textbook case of widespread and methodical electoral fraud, with an added dash of nepotism to underscore  just how little the Aliyev clan, buoyant on both the financial and geopolitical advantages of Azerbaijan’s vast oil and gas wealth, is concerned to maintain the facade of democracy for either domestic or international purposes. 

Opposition parties, predictably, took only two of the 125 legislative seats on offer, while the president’s wife, uncle, and indeed his cousin’s husband were all elected easily.

The main message of these polls therefore, was that the regime feels that its current position is so secure that is no longer answerable to anyone; neither its own citizens, nor foreigners. 

But if there are redeeming aspects to this sorry business, they are:

Firstly that, having learned from the fallout from the Azerbaijani Presidential elections in 2008, and despite expectations from many that western organizations such as the OSCE would go easy on the regime, the OSCE Election Observation Mission (EOM) did in fact stand up for the principles it embodies, spoke truth to power, and criticised these elections for the sham they were. 

In the words of the head of mission, Audrey Glover at the 8th November press conference, “Regrettably, our observation of the overall process shows that the conditions necessary for a meaningful democratic election were not established. We are particularly concerned about restrictions of fundamental freedoms, media bias, the dominance of public life by one party, and serious violations on election day.”

This is good news for the West’s somewhat tattered reputation among the Azerbaijani opposition, and for the OSCE’s reputation throughout the region.

Secondly, that both the EU (in the form of an admittedly rather weedy statement from Catherine Ashton) and the US, in a separate comment by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip Crowley, have fully backed the OSCE’s findings.

And therefore it would seem that the EU and US are less willing to put up with the regime’s shenanigans than might have been the case before the 2008 economic crisis.

But perhaps we should not be so surprised, since lower hydrocarbon prices, and the rapidly increasing diversity of Europe’s gas supplies, which are now staring to include the re-export of formerly US-bound Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) cargoes, may well be mean that the Aliyev regime’s international position is no longer as strong as it was.

Posted in Azerbaijan, Democratization, Elections, Electoral Fraud, European Union, Hydrocarbons, OSCE | 1 Comment »

The Ukraine, Brussels, sticks and carrots.

Posted by democratist on November 2, 2010

2nd November 2010,

Yesterday Democratist reported on questions surrounding the validity of Sunday’s local election results in Ukraine, and suggested it might have been preferable for the OSCE to field a more substantial team than the four international observers they employed for these elections.

Additionally in our opinion, these apparent recent electoral shenanigans do much to confirm the analysis set out in a recent paper by the Centre for European Reform (CER); “Ukraine turns away from democracy and the EU.”

The CER’s main point is that, while Ukraine has not yet turned towards Russia as such under Yanukovich, there has been a clear shift back towards authoritarianism since the presidential elections this February; opposition TV channels have been closed down, foreign foundations and universities harassed, presidential rule restored through a manipulated constitutional court, and criminal proceedings launched against senior figures from the previous administration.

Democratist agrees with the CER that it is high time for the EU to take note of what is going on in Ukraine, and act on it.

We need to see tougher statements coming out of Brussels and member state capitals; we need to see Catherine Ashton visiting Kiev, ideally accompanied by national leaders and/or other senior officials to underline the importance the EU attaches to Ukraine’s continued democratization (these could be linked to trade issues), and we need to see Ashton and others giving interviews to embattled local media outlets.

These issues should also be raised in detail at the next EU-Ukraine summit on 22nd November.

We also need to see progress on people-to-people issues such as the conclusion of  an “action plan” on visas, which would spell out the steps Ukraine needs to take for the EU to abolish visa requirements altogether. More scholarships for students would also be useful.

Ideally, of course, the EU should offer Ukraine a long-term membership prospective (although this seems very unlikely at the moment given the economic climate, and reticence from Germany and the Netherlands).

But, as the CER makes clear, the EU still has a number of both sticks and carrots at its disposal.

Posted in European Union, Ukraine | 2 Comments »

 
Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.